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1       Introduction 
 
The proper choice of the exchange rate regime has been a central and a highly controversial 
debate, with successive shifts that can be traced to changing events, since the seventies. After 
the breakdown of the fixed adjustable peg system of Bretton Woods, the IMF’s position on 
exchange rates regimes moved toward the notion that corner solutions either irrevocably fixed 
rates  (currency  board  or  dollarization)  or  purely  floating  rates  should  be  preferred.  In 
particular intermediate regimes were strongly discouraged especially after the Asian crisis 
which has often been interpreted as evidence against the soft pegging regimes. More recently a 
growing body of opinion has questioned the relevance of the two corner regimes.  
   
The Middle Eastern and North African (Hence forth MENA) countries offer some evidence 
against the superiority of extreme regimes. Most MENA countries opted for a fixed adjustable 
exchange rate regime in the early 1970s. The adoption of fixed rates was originally justified 
by  the  desire  to  dampen  inflationary  pressures  and  to  achieve  macro-economic  stability. 
However,  once  the  immediate  threats  of  high  inflation  had  been  avoided,  most  MENA 
countries moved to intermediate regimes. Only a small number of countries actually turned to 
fully flexible exchange rates. Moreover the longevity of those soft peg exchange rate regimes 
makes MENA countries somewhat peculiar and raises questions. 
 
An  appropriate  exchange  rate  regime  has  to  be  analyzed  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
economic and historical characteristics of a country. MENA countries, although economically 
heterogeneous, share a common heritage, and a common set of challenges. Oil, and other 
natural resources, remain a substantial source of foreign exchange earnings in this region. 
Large  external  and  real  shocks  have  made  the  region  sensitive  to  speculative  attacks. 
Conventional theory tells us that a higher degree of exchange rate flexibility is advisable in 
this case, which casts doubts on the viability of intermediate regimes in absence of wages and 
prices  flexibility.  Indeed,  the  majority  of  MENA  countries  covered  in  this  analysis  have 
maintained some degree of price controls, contributing to price stickiness, a feature which is 
confirmed by labor market indicators for most of them. 
1 
                                                 
1  This  rigidity  was  more  pronounced  in  the  cases  of  Egypt,  Morocco,  Algeria,  and  Tunisia,  while  Jordan, 
Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE seem to have some labour market flexibility. Source: (www.pogar.org) 
Programme on Governance in Arab Region.   3 
So far, the MENA countries have avoided severe crisis which plagued other regions over the 
past  two  decades,  although  for  different  reasons.  Most  of  these  countries  with  no  oil 
resources, were relatively closed and centrally planned, and have reduced exposure to external 
shocks using strict controls on capital movement. In the case of oil producers, such as Gulf 
countries which were more open and thus more vulnerable, the large amount of reserves in 
US$ resulting from exports of oil and profit returns of overseas investments helped to dampen 
the magnitude of the shock and thus sustain the peg. 
 
However, if certain MENA countries have implemented sustainable exchange rate regimes 
under current economic and financial conditions, others are undergoing pressure to reforms in 
response to new domestic and global challenges.  Globalizations, international and regional 
trade liberalization in general or within the framework of regional agreements, such as the 
Association Agreement with the European Union (AAEU) or the Grand Arab Area of Free 
Trade (GAAFT) represent a major change of the economic environment of MENA countries. 
These developments raise the question whether, the current exchange rate regimes remain 
appropriate.  Actually, the nineties was a decade of economic reforms and certain countries 
have  achieved  considerable  progress  toward  market  economy  and  financial  integration.  
Prices and trade regimes were liberalized and foreign direct investment was encouraged while 
exchange rates became more flexible. However, while some countries moved to more flexible 
regimes, they have continued to manage heavily their currencies, although they sometimes 
officially declared to be floaters. 
 
In this paper, we aim to investigate the main determinants of exchange rate regimes in MENA 
countries using a large set of economic and political variables. In this effort, we use a pooled 
ordered probit model as the reference for our empirical test. Then, we  employ static and 
dynamic ordered random effects probit model in order to exploit the panel structure of our 
data.  Our analysis relies first on IMF (de jure) classification and then we check our results 
against LYS (de facto) classification and we discuss the discrepancies between the results 
obtained from the two classification. 
In the following section, we describe the evolution of exchange rate arrangement and the 
discrepancies between de facto  and de jure classifications in MENA countries. Section 3 
reviews the theoretical hypotheses of different approaches to the exchange rate regime choice. 
In Section 4, we discuss the construction of our independents variables and then test their 
relevance empirically using different estimation strategies and employing both de jure and de   4 
facto classifications. The results of our estimations are presented in Section 5. Finally Section 
6 provides some conclusions. 
 
2  2  2  2       Exchange Rate Regimes in Middle East and North Africa 
Countries 
 
2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1 Classification of Exchange Rate Regime  
 
 Choosing  the  proper  classification  of  exchange  rate  arrangements  before  investigating  is 
crucial and not straight-forward. In particular the exclusive use of official classifications could 
be misleading.  Many important research papers on exchange rate regimes
2 stress the gap 
between what countries say they do and what they really do. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) found 
that countries who claim they allow their exchange rate to float often do not actually do so. 
Either, Gosh et al. (1997), report that many countries with a fixed exchange rate, realign their 
exchange rates frequently, thus in some sense, moving in the direction of flexible exchange 
rate regime. 
 
In this study we use two alternative classifications. We first review the results obtained using 
the  official  classification  of  the  IMF’s  published  in  its  Annual  Report  on  Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. For the sake of comparability we aggregate the 
eight different categories of the IMF to only three broad categories: fix, intermediate and 
float. The de jure classification captures essentially the type of commitment of the central 
bank on which the expectation is built. However, it fails to account observed policies, which 
turn to be inconsistent with this commitment, as shown by Vuletin (2004). For this reason, we 
supplement our analysis by the de facto classification, based on the indexes calculated  by 
Bubula Ökter-Robe (2002), henceforth BOR, and Levy-Yeyati  and Sturzenegger, (2005) , 
henceforth LYS, which are also classified into three groups( see Table 1 in Annex I). 
 
In fact, Bubula Ökter-Robe (2002) used the IMF’data from 1999 and onward and apply the 
IMF’s methodology for estimating earlier data. Their approach includes some refinement to 
the IMF classification by distinguishing between "backward-looking» and "forward-looking" 
                                                 
2 New methodologies of classification have been proposed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Bubula Otker Robe 
(2002),Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), Dubas, Lee, Mark (2005) Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry, Wolf, (1997), 
Poirson (2001), Courdert, Dubert (2004), Shambaugh J. (2003). 
   5 
crawls,  and  between  strictly  managed  float  and  other  managed  float  regimes.  Their 
characterization  of  the  de  facto  behavior  of  these  countries  relies  heavily  on  official 
information from members countries and the IMF’s country database besides to other source 
of information like press reports.  
 
Contrary to BOR, Levy-Yeyati et al (2005) ignore the IMF classification. They build their 
own  classification  based  on  two  criteria  which  are  the  volatility  of  exchange  rates  and 
reserves. This makes data availability for a longer time period. However, this classification 
suffers from serious drawbacks. In particular a few countries or some years could not be 
classified  unambiguously  and  a  special  the  category  “inconclusive” 
3  was  introduced.  To 
overcome this problem we took the classification of Reinhart and Roggof (2004) whenever 
available,  and  if  not,  we  took  the  IMF  classification  after  comparing  it  with  the  BOR 

















                                                 
3 In the latest version of their study, LYS considered that the inconclusive observations are peges although the 
volatility of their exchange rate is zero or if they are declared as being fixed exchange rate regime by the IMF 
and the Volatility of their nominal exchange rate is less than 0.1%. This drastically reduces the number of 
inconclusive observations to 2.4%. 
4 Countries for which LYS dataset are missing data (including inconclusive) are Algeria (4 observations), Egypt 
(9 observations), Kuwait (5 observations), Libya (3 observations), Morocco (14 observations), and Yemen (4 
observations). 
   6 
2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 The Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes in MENA 
 
       We show the general trend of regime evolution in this region according first to the IMF 
classification and then the de facto classification of BOR and LYS in order to explore any 
discrepancies  between  the  three  methods  of  classification.  Figure  1,  below  shows  the 
evolution of exchange regimes through 1990 -2006.    


































We can arguably distinguish two sub-periods.  During the first period, between 1990 and 
1999  51%  of  MENA  countries  adopted  a  fixed  exchange  rate  regime,  more  precisely  an 
adjustable  peg.  This  proportion  decreased  slightly  since  1992  in  favor  of  more  flexible 
regimes  but  it  underwent  a  significant  increase  up  to  67.5%  during  the  2000-2006.  The 
adoption  of  more  rigid  regimes  by  the  six  Gulf  countries  of  which  are  currently  in  a 
convergence process for a monetary union in 2010, may explain  the rising share of fixed  in 
detriment of intermediate regimes which fell by 14 percent between 1998 and 2006  . The 
following table gives further information on the changes of regimes during this period.  
 
Table 2: Countries included in the sample with information on the direction and the 
number of exchange rate regimes switch for the sample period 
Country  I  II  Country  I  II 
Algeria   1  4  Turkey   2  0 
Morocco   0  0  Iran   3  2 
Tunisia   3  -1  Saudi Arabia   1  -1 
Libya   1  0  Bah rain  1  -1 
Egypt   5  0  U.A.E  1  -1 
Yemen   1  2  Kuwait   0  0 
Jordan   0  0  Oman   0  0 
Syria   0  0  Qatar   1  -1 
Lebanon   1  -2          
Note: Column (I) reports the number of regime change. 
          Column (II) indicates the direction of regime's switch: a positive number means that a country is moving 
         toward more flexible regime, while a  large negative number indicates that a country tightens its regime. 
   7 
We see that 29.41% of countries did not change the initially chosen regime, 35.29 % have 
changed their regime only once and 32.53% have frequently changed their regime during the 
sample period, either because they had experienced some crises (Turkey, Egypt) or, because 
their  economic  conditions  changed  significantly  (Tunisia).  Concerning  the  direction  of 
transition, we note that 22% of these countries move in the same direction towards greater 
flexibility, while others moved from less flexible regimes to more flexible and then reverse 
their choices later.  
 
Turning now to the de facto classification, the two charts show a systematic differences not 
only between the de jure and the de facto classification but also between the two  supposedly 
de facto classifications. 
 
























































































The  BOR  de  facto  distribution  shows  that  the  intermediate  regime  always  constitutes  a 
sizeable proportion of total regimes although this share decreased since 1996 in favour of   8 
more flexible regimes
5, while the LYS de facto classification attributes a much lower share to 
of intermediate regimes. 
Several authors have addressed the problem of discrepancies between the de jure and de facto 
classification, including Calvo and Reinhart (2002) , LYS, Alesina and Wagner (2006) Von 
Hagen and Zhou (2004), Genberg and Swoboda (2004). For example, Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002)  define  fear  of  floating  as  de  jure  floating  while  the  country  intervenes  to  absorb 
nominal exchange rate fluctuation. Levy- Yeyati, Sturzenegger et al. (2006) define fear of 
pegging as having de facto anchor but claiming another exchange rate regime.  
 
To identify the situations where actions (deeds) do not correspond to announcements (words), 
we take the difference between de facto and de jure classification.  The results are presented 
in table (3) and (4).
6 
Table 3 :  Divergence between deed (de facto) BOR versus word  (de jure) IMF 
Sample period: 1990-2001 
BOR  IMF 
  0 Fix  1 Intermediate  2Float  Total 
0 Fix  93  42  10  145 
1 Intermediate  1  4  34  39 
2 Float  6  2  12  20 
Total          100  48  56  204 
Total deviation from announcement  7%  91.7%  78.57%   
Note: Note: numbers in bold show observations where announced regime corresponds to real one. The ones below 
           indicate fear of peg and those above indicate fear of float     
 
 
Table 4 : Divergence between deed (de facto) LYS versus word  (de jure) IMF 
Sample period: 1990-2006 
LYS  IMF 
   0 Fix  1 Intermediate  2 Float  Total 
0  Fix  139  41  21  201 
1 Intermediate  4  1  24  29 
2 float  14  10  35  59 
Total  157  52  80  289 
Total deviation from announcement  11.46%  98%  56.25%   
Note: numbers in bold show observations where announced regime correspond to real one. The ones  below   
           indicate fear of peg  and those above indicate fear of float        
 
We note that a large number of observations indicate a deviation from the policy announced 
with  greater  divergence  for  floating  regimes.  For  example  in  Table  4,  while  we  have  86 
                                                 
5 More specifically, we have less number of floating regime lesser comparing to the number obtained by official 
typology (6 against 25% in average). 
6 (Alesina and Wagner, 2006)   9 
observations indicating a fear of floating




3     3     3     3     Theoretical Determinants of Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
        The modern literature about the choice of exchange rate regimes dates back to the sixties 
with Mundell’s theory of optimum currency area (OCA). This approach, relates the choice of 
an exchange rate regime to a set of criteria. Mundell (1961) claimed that, a fixed exchange 
rate regime is advisable in presence of mobility of production factors (works and capital) 
and/or flexibility of prices and wages. In these two cases the adjustment can be achieved 
without exchange rate flexibility. Mac Kinnon (1963) argued that, the more open the economy 
the more it has to benefit from exchange rate stability because it reduces the fluctuations of 
relative prices between tradable and non-tradable goods and its repercussions to domestic 
prices. Furthermore, he dismissed the effectiveness of parity changes and said in particular 
that the expected effects of devaluation (the increase in exports or the decrease in imports) 
will  be  limited.
  9  Kenen  (1969)  found  that  a  diversified  economy  can  successfully  offset 
shocks and hence can easily adopt a fixed exchange rate regime and joins an optimal currency 
area. 
 
Mundell and Fleming (1970) made a step further when they acknowledged that the choice of 
an  optimal  regime  has  to  take  into  account  not  only  the  structural  characteristics  of  the 
economy, but also the nature of shocks. In particular, monetary and real shocks have different 
implications on the economy if the shocks come mostly from the good’s market, a flexible 
exchange rate should be preferred. On the contrary, a fixed exchange rate would be more 
appropriate if the origin of the shocks is the money market.
10 This is consistent with the 
                                                 
7 Tunisia 1990-1992 and 1996/1998/2001 Egypt: 1990-1998 Syria 1993-1998 and 2002 2004 Yemen: 1999-
2004 Iran: 1994-1998/2003/ 2004. 
8  Tunisia  99/2000/2003/2004,  Libya  92-93-94-98-99-2002,  Egypt:  99/2000/2001/2002,  Jordan  and  Lebanon 
1990-1993. 
9 In an open economy, the cost of production will be influenced by the prices of gross primary materials and the 
imported intermediate goods. Furthermore, in the case of devaluation, the effects of inflation caused by the rise 
of the necessary importation’s prices raise immediately the prices of other goods and wages limiting hence the 
expected effects of devaluation and the exchange rate lost its ability like an adjustment instrument. 
10 Real shocks represents par example the fluctuations in the foreign demand on the export of goods and services 
(tourism),  weather condition, changes in productivity, term of  trade shock.  As  for Monterey’s  shocks, they 
reflect  the  instability  of  money  demand  manifested  the  undesirability  of  economics’  agents  to  acquit  the 
domestic money either the fluctuation of confidence level.    10 
Keynesian  view  on  regime’s  selection,  which  stresses  the  importance  of  achieving 
simultaneously external and internal equilibria while using the exchange rate.
11 
 
During the nineties a significant increase in capital mobility has stressed the importance of 
sound and stable domestic financial sectors as a condition for the choice of an exchange rate 
regime, Chang and Velasco (1998). This new economic environment creates the potential for 
large and sudden reversals in net flows. Thus, the capacity of countries to avoid an exchange 
rate  crisis  depends  on  its  capacity  to  appropriately  manage  huge  amount  of  inflow  and 
outflows. An excessive capital outflow accompanied with overspending form an immediate 
source for currency crisis. Krugman (1996) explains that if a small open economy has created 
an excess of domestic credit over the demand of money, economic agents will observe this 
misalignment between fixed exchange rate and growth rate of money, and a speculative attack 
may occur.  Even so, a simple rumour on possible devaluation is able, according to self-
fulfilling hypothesis, to trigger a bank crisis. This problem is more pronounced in countries 
with an open capital account which can prompt theses countries to move toward either hard 
pegs or pure float. Nevertheless, capital account controls might make it easier to sustain a 
fixed exchange rate and thus some developing and emerging market may be still reasonably 
well off with an intermediate regime. 
  
A new approach, the so called “fear of floating”, introduced by Calvo and Reinhart (2000), 
has been put forward, most recently and forcefully after the advanced researches on method of 
classification. Calvo and Reinhart notice that many countries that say they float do not in 
reality whereas countries with fixed exchange rate have a de facto intermediate regime. Such 
practice  is  common  in  emergent  and  developing  countries  due  to  various  reasons  like 
exchange rate pass-through, credibility issues, original sin
12, and currency mismatch. These 
reasons make exchange rate volatility intolerable for emerging market countries, Hausmann, 
Ugo and Stein (2001). 
  
                                                 
11 Devereaux (1999), in his dynamic general equilibrium model find that the adoption of fixed exchange rate 
interrupts an effective response to shocks. The results indicate that, exchange rate role, as a macroeconomic 
instrument of adjustment does not help the economy to adjust face to specific productivity or demand shock. 
Since prices are pre-set, productivity’s shock has no effect on the output, which is determined by the demand, 
and therefore, the exchange rate does not response to productivity shock specific to the country even under 
floating exchange rate. Fixed exchange rate does not eliminate hence the ability of the economy to adjust face of 
different shocks. 
12 Calvo and Reinhart (2000) show that if a country has a large share of exports and imports libelled U.S. $, a 
depreciation tends to induce debt and fiscal crisis because, it increases the debt denominated in foreign currency.   11 
On  an  empirical  basis,  Reinhart,  Rogoff  and  Savastano  (2003)  studied  various  dollarized 
economies through the period 1996-2001. They find that, the pass through is very important 
in highly dollarized economies which explains why central banks in emerging countries show 
less of tolerance toward important variation of exchange rate. Indeed, economic dollarization 
combined  with  the  lack  of  credibility  draw  on  liability  dollarization,  which  incites  these 
economies to take into account the adverse  effects of exchange rate variation on sectoral 
balance sheet, and in consequence on aggregated revenue. 
 
Hausmann, Ugo and Stein (2001) have tested currency mismatch hypothesis and exchange 
rate pass through in a sample of 30 countries having de facto floating exchange rate. Their 
results confirm that  central banks have been more concerned with limiting exchange rate 
volatility if currency mismatch and pass-through level are very high. Moreover, Countries 
with unhedged foreign currency debt have a tendency to keep an important level of foreign 
reserves and to intervene in exchange markets in order to mitigate exchange rate volatility, 
Hausmann and Ugo (2003). 
  
Berg,  Borensztein  (2000)  find  that  a  high  level  of  currency  substitution  implies  fixed 
exchange rate. Their conclusion is not clear-cut because the source of shocks still matters. 
However, it is highly plausible that in the case of an extensive currency substitution, monetary 
shocks will be relatively higher in magnitude than real shocks, and thus a fixed exchange rate 
regime will be more appropriate. 
 
Honig (2005) uses different measures of dollarization on a large cross-country sample through 
the  period  1988-2001.  He  finds  that,    an  increase  in  dollarization  is  associated  with  less 
flexible  exchange  rate  regime  but  he  adds  that,  the  effect  of  dollarization’s  variables  on 
exchange rate regime choice should depend on the degree of openness of the economy
13 and 
in particular, the extent to which firms earn revenue in dollars.
14  
 
Additional  reasons  why  there  is  still  a  strong  support  for  fixed  exchange  rate  in  some 
countries are mainly related to the political economies consideration and the pressures of 
interest groups. The decision about the exchange rate regime choice is mostly implemented 
                                                 
13 He explains that the negative effect of increased dollarization on exchange rate flexibility should be smaller 
(in absolute value) in more open economies as dollar liabilities are more likely to be matched with dollar assets. 
14 For example, if firms borrow in dollar and earn in dollar, they face no currency mismatch, but if they earn in 
local currency, depreciation may cause a net loose.    12 
taking into account pressures as well as the need to build support for policies.15 More clearly, 
a high volatility of nominal exchange rate combined with rigid price translates into volatility 
in relative prices of tradable and non-tradable goods. This could cause political upheaval in 
countries where both sectors are large and/or the lobbies are powerful. For producers and 
exporters of light manufacturing goods the volatility of exchange rate is a tough constraint 
leading to calls for protection.  . Moreover, besides to the fear of floating, some countries may 
experience  a  "fear  of  pegging".  The  peg  may  invite  speculation  when  a  misalignment  is 
expected, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002). Therefore, there are always good reasons to 
avoid both the system of fixed exchange and floating regime and opt for an intermediate 
regime. 
 
Numerous authors emphasize the role of credibility of monetary authorities and other political 
and institutional factors in the process of selecting an optimal exchange rate regime. Lack of 
institution strength or political instability make fixed exchange rates more difficult to sustain 
which  may  increase  the  attractiveness  of  tying  one’s  hand  through  a  currency  board  that 
impose fiscal and monetary discipline and thus reinforces credibility and  public confidence. 
However, Tornel and Velasco (1994) show that this is not entirely true and that all depend on 
discount rate of government and the advantage induced by each regime. The government can 
finance budgetary deficits by issuing debt for a temporary period (inflation tax).  The costs of 
such fiscal policy appear differently, according to the exchange rate regime in place. Under a 
fixed exchange rate regime, the costs will not be observable until inflation appears at some 
point in the future. Conversely, under a flexible exchange rate regime, inflation is observed 
soon, due to higher expected inflation in the future. 
16 
  
Furthermore, the type of relation that induces the governance and political factors is 
not always clear. For example, while Edward (1996) and Collin (1996) consider that a weak 
government  and  unstable  political  environment  reduce  the  probability  of  choosing  fixed 
regime
17. Alesina and Wagner (2006) and Honig (2007) argue that weak governments may be 
                                                 
15 Bernhard and Leblang (1999)  
16 Then, a fixed exchange rate induces more fiscal discipline when the fiscal authorities are sufficiently patient 
so that, costs in the future will have a deterrent power. If the fiscal authorities are impatient, flexible rate will 
provides more fiscal discipline. 
17 According to Edward (1996) the discount rate factor of the government is negatively correlated with political 
instability. high political instability contribute to shorten the horizon in politicians’ decision making who favors 
intermediate benefits to long term benefits to ensure their re-election.   13 
willing to use a peg as an instrument to enhance the credibility and to increase the confidence 
in the domestic currency and thus tame inflationary expectation. 
4       Identifying Exchange Rate Regimes Choice in MENA Countries 
 
             In  this  section  we  present  the  econometric  model  which  is  applied  to  test  the 
hypotheses presented in the previous section, in a unified framework. 
4.1 The Data 
 
         The  sample  includes  17  transition  and  developing  MENA  countries.  Data  were  not 
available  for  a  uniform  period  for  all  countries.  We  then  conducted  our  analysis  on  an 
unbalanced panel data for the period 1990-2006. Our dependant variable characterizes the 
nature of the exchange rate regime and takes three values ordered by level of flexibility. See 
table 1, Appendix I. 
 
The control variables were chosen to proxy the factors discussed in section 3.1 and were 
extracted from various sources. Our data include the degree of openness as  measured by the 
ratio of exports plus imports of goods and services to GDP using data from International 
Financial Statistics (IFS); the level of economic development as  proxied by the log of a five 
year  backward  moving  average  of  real  per  capita  GDP,  source  (CEPII);  the  geographical 
concentration of trade measured by Gini-Hirchman coefficient; the degree of specialisation in 
primary goods exports, calculated as a ratio of primary commodity exports to total exports.
 18  
To construct these two proxies, we mainly used data from the UN COMTRADE database and 
alternatively, when trade data were not available, the Arab Monetary Fund data base (AMF). 
 
The size of the financial sector was approximated by the ratio of domestic credit provided by 
the banking sector to GDP.  To proxy balance sheet effects, we used two indicators. The first 
one was the ratio of external dollar mismatch in the banking system defined as the ratio of 
foreign liabilities to foreign assets and the second is the ratio of foreign-currency liabilities to 
the money supply. Data for both measures were obtained from IFS statistics. 
 
To test for other variables linked to institutional and political factors we considered, first, the 
inflation  differential  rate,  calculated  as  the  difference  between  domestic  price  levels 
                                                 
18 This data base is mapped into SITC classification. We use 9-digit SITC classification. The primary goods      
exports include the commodities in SITC: section 0 to 5.   14 
(measured by the consumer price index) and the foreign price level, the latter being the trade-
weighted average of its first five trading partners' consumer price indices, both in natural 
logarithms; second, we considered capital control index defined as the sum of four dummies 
variables that represent the existence of the following restrictions: i. separate exchange rates for 
some  or  all  capital  transactions;  ii.  restrictions  on  payments  for  current  transactions;  iii. 
restrictions on payments for capital transactions
19 and iii. surrender on repatriation requirement 
for export proceeds. All were taken from the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions, and finally, control for corruption index that measures the extent to 
which  public  power  is  exercised  for  private  gain,  including  petty  and  grand  forms  of 
corruption,  as  well  as  “captured”  of  the  state  by  elites  and  private  interests.  The  latter 
indicator is available only for the period 1996-2006 and was obtained from Kaufmann et al 
(World Bank). 
  
In addition we also used a dummy variable (time) that takes the value of 1 for all year from 
1999 onwards and zero otherwise in order to test the existence of a structural break in the 
distribution of exchange rate regime  in 1999 (as suggested by Figure 1). 
 
Given that many countries in our sample are producers and exporters of oil and other primary 
goods,  we  should  note  that  some  previous  variables  namely  specialisation  level  could  be 
given a political economic interpretation although they reflect the structural characteristics of 
the country. This is probably due to the high weight given to this variable in designing the 
exchange rate policy. Indeed, openness could be also considered as a proxy for the pass-
through of the exchange rate into imports price hence reflecting the fear of floating view
20. 
Appendix  (I)  provides  more  information  on  the  construction  and  the  sources  of  all 
independent  variables  used  in  our  empirical  analysis  (table  5),  including  the  summary 
statistics (table 6) and the correlation matrix table (7). 
 
                                                 
19 Since 1997, EAER reports 11 separate categories for controls on capital transactions which are: (1) capital  
market securities, (2) money market instruments, (3) collective investment securities, (4) derivatives and other 
instruments, (5) commercial credits, (6) financial credits, (7) guarantees, sureties, and financial backup facilities, 
(8) direct investment, (9) liquidation of direct investment, (10) real estate transactions, and (11) personal capital 
movements.  we  follow  thus  since  this  date  Glik  and  Hutchison’s  definition  (2005)  and  consider  that  the 
restrictions on payments for  capital transactions dummy takes the value of 1 if controls were in place 5 or more 
of the EAER 11 sub-categories of capital account restriction and  “financial credit” was one of the categories 
restricted and 0 otherwise. 
20 openess can capture both the extent of foreign demand shocks (which is expected to favor flexibility) and the 
impact of the exchange-rate on prices (which is expected to favor fixing).,Bénassy-Quèré and Coeuré (2002).   15 
 
 
4 4 4 4. . . .2  2  2  2 The Methodology 
 
                The  starting  point  for  our  econometric  specification  is  an  unobserved  latent 
dependant variable y
* i,t  which describe the choice of exchange rate regime, given that the 
possible choices are  yit  =  {0, 1, 2} for fixed, intermediate, and floating regimes respectively. 
Then we can estimate the following model: 
 
  y
* i,t = x'i,t  β+ νi,t          for      i = 1,2……N   ;    t = 1,2,…..T   
 
 
              Where the subscripts  i  and  t stand for the country and time indices, respectively,  
x'it is a vector of exogenous determinants of the exchange rate regime choice in the sense that 
E(xi,t, νj,s) = 0  and β is the coefficient vectors to be estimated. 
 
We start our estimation by employing a pooled ordered probit model assuming the 
error term νi,t to be independent and identically distributed with a means zero and a variance 
σ² for all countries i and over time t ignoring thus the additional information contained in our 
panel.Then we exploit the panel structure of our data taking into account the unobserved 
heterogeneity factors that could affect country’s decision about exchange rate regime. We 
control for this effects by estimating a random-effects ordered probit model 
21since the fixed 
effects probit model is actually always inconsistent in the case of non linear models and is 
subject to incidental parameters problem, Greene (2002).  
In the random effects specification the error term νi,t  is the sum of two components:  
 νi,t = ηi + εi,t   the term ηi is assumed to be a time independent individual specific random 
effect with zero mean and variance  σ
2(η) reflecting the unobserved country heterogeneity 
while εi,t is assumed to be a normally distributed random error term with zero mean and 
variance σ
2εi,t   constant
 22 that is serially independent both among individuals and over time.  
The random effects model imposes also the restriction that the correlation between successive 
error terms for the same country is a constant: corr (νi,t, νj,s)= ρ= ση/(1+ ση)      if  t ≠ s. 
                                                 
21  We  use  Butler  and  Moffitt  (1982)  random  effects  probit  model  and  the  estimation  program  written  and 
implemented in STATA by Frechette (2001). 
22 In ordered probit specification, the variance of the error term is normalised to 1 : σε=1.   16 
Since y
*
i,t is unobservable, what we observe is the choice of exchange rate regime yit for 
country i, at time  t. We therefore have that conditional on being in each regime; yit is related 
to this latent variable and a cut-off parameter    
23 as ; 
 
               0     if       y
*
i,t   ≤  0 ,  
y i,t =        1     if       0     <  y
*
i,t   ≤     ,  
               2     if             ≤  y
*
i,t    
 
Under the unrestrictive assumption of normality of εi,t  the associated probabilities of being in 
each state j ( j = 0, 1, 2 ) are : (Maddala 1983) 
 
 
Pyit=0 = Ф(–x'i,t  β+ ηi )          
 
Pyit=1 = Ф ( –x'i,t  β+ ηi) - Ф(–x'i,t  β+ ηi)     
 
Pyit=2= 1- Ф( -x'i,t  β+ ηi)   
 
 
The parameters of the model, the βs (the coefficients on the x variables) and the unknown cut-
off values (the µs) can be estimated then by maximising the likelihood function using the 
standard normal distribution function Ф(.). 
As well, we are also particularly interested in state dependence effect, which may potentially 
be an important factor in our study, as the present exchange rate regime choice may be highly 
correlated with the past choice. To control for state dependence, we include the lagged choice 
of exchange rate regime as an explanatory variable into the model, then: 
  y
* i,t = γ y
* i,t-1 +  x'i,t  β+ νi,t          for      i = 1,2……N   ;    t = 1,2,…..T   
 
Where y
* i,t   is a vector for dummy variables and represent the country’s choice of exchange 
rate regimes in the previous period . We assume that the initial observations are exogenous 
variables.  
Before discussing the results of our empirical test it is important to note that previous studies 
on exchange rate regime choice have raised doubts on the direction of the causal relation 
between certain determinants and exchange rate regime as for inflation and foreign liability.  
In  order  to  mitigate  potential  endogeneity  bias,  some  explanatory  variables  have  been 
included in the regression equation with one lags.  
                                                 
23It is not possible to identify both the constant term and all of the cut-off points. So, in order to estimate the 
model, some of the threshold values (µ’s) have to be fixed. Here   is set equal to zero or the constant term is 
excluded from the regression model   17 
5 5 5 5  The Econometric Results 
 
In  the  next  sub-section,  we  examine  the  empirical  relevance  of  the  previous  variables  in 
explaining the type of exchange rate regime in MENA. We use two estimation strategies. 
First, we run a full sample pooled ordered probit. Second, we re-estimate the model using a 
random effects ordered probit model in order to account for country heterogeneity. In the first 
sub-section we discuss the results obtained using de jure IMF classification and in the second 
those obtained using de jure and de facto LYS. In the third sub-section section, we add a 
dynamic  dimension  to  our  analysis  by  introducing  the  lagged  dependant  variable  as  an 
explanatory variable to the random effects probit specification. 
 
We should note that the random effects specification requires the exclusion from the sample 
of all countries that stay on the same regime through the whole time period of the sample. 
This leaves us, with a smaller sample size (12 countries for IMF classification and only 9 for 
LYS classification). This change in sample size makes the comparison between the (de jure) 
and the (de facto) results somewhat more difficult. For the estimation we proceeded in a 
sequential way.  We started the regression with a set of factors suggested by the theory of   
optimal  currency  areas,  financial  characteristics  and  the  fear  of  floating  approaches 
(column1), Then, we introduced progressively additional factors representing institutional and 
politics variables The results are reported in table ( 8-a to 9-b) . 
 
The log-likelihood (LL) chi-square and Mac-Fadden’s pseudo-R² , presented below the tables, 
are the two indicators of the goodness of fit that were used to compare between estimated 
models.
24  Rho  (ρ)  is the coefficient  of  cross-correlation  that  measures  the  significance  of 
random effects. It is strongly significant in all cases for de jure classification, and in one case 
only (column 1) for de facto classification suggesting significant heterogeneity effect. 
A negative sign of a coefficient means that an increase of the associated variable raises the 
probability of choosing fixed regime relative to intermediate and floating ones. 
 
                                                 
24 A high value of these two statistical tests suggests that the model explains the choice of currency regimes best. 
The log likelihood chi-square is an omnibus test to see if the model as a whole is statistically significant. It is 2 
times the difference between the log likelihood of the current model and the log likelihood of the intercept-only 
model. 
A  pseudo  R-square  capture  more  or  less  the  same  thing  in  that  it  is  the  proportion  of  change  in  terms  of 
likelihood. Mc Fadden R² = 1- (last iteration / current iteration)  . The ratio of the likelihoods suggests the level 
of improvement over the intercept model offered by the full model   18 
The time dummy, we have included for modelling structural change , reveals also a strongly 
significant and robust effect across model specifications  but, although it reflects the general 
move toward less flexible regimes (adjustable peg) in the de jure classification, it reflects a 
shift toward more flexible regimes in the de facto classification. 
 
We should note that some of previous variables can be a proxy for different theories and the 
sign of the coefficients may be subject to different interpretations. The theoretical researches 
on exchange rate regime choice are ambiguous. Even at the empirical levels, the evidence is 
controversial and do not provide conclusive evidence on any set of determinants. The results 
remain dependant on the sample of countries, period of analysis, variables included, strategy 
of estimation, and the method of classification employed. 
 
We think that, when a country have not chosen the exchange rate regime predicted by one  
approach   this ,  might be because  other important characteristics that are likely to influence 
the choice have been ignored. Expanding exchange rate determinants progressively would 
provide a more comprehensive picture on countries’ economic and institutional restriction. 
The estimated coefficient’s sign is a good  guide for judging the most pertinent theory in 
explaining exchange rate regime choice.  
 
5.1.1  5.1.1  5.1.1  5.1.1 De Jure Exchange Rate Regime 
 
 Table (8-a, 8-b) reports the results of estimation for static pooled and random effects ordered 
probit model respectively.  
The results highlight the high level of statistic significance of the included variables. The two 
goodness of fit, we use, increase monotony with the inclusion of more variables. Comparing 
between  the  two  specifications,  Mac-Fadden’s  pseudo-R²  is  higher  under  random  effects 
specification, suggesting that this model explains better the choice of exchange rate regime in 
our sample.  
 
Most variables show a robust significant and unchanged negative sign across all models under 
both specifications. These variables include factors related to: openness, specification level, 
financial  development,  liability  dollarization  and  capital  control.  A  high  level  of  these 
variables raises the probability of choosing a fixed exchange rate regime. 
   19 
In contrast to the previous variables, Inflation differential, although significant, it was not 
robust  to  the  specification  methods  employed.    It  seems  to  be  positively  associated  with 
floating  exchange  rate  regime  in  the  pooled  specification,  suggesting  that,  the  more 
divergence a country’s inflation rate from that of its trading partners, the more need will be to 
frequent adjustment of exchange rate so that more flexible exchange rate will be preferred. 
Surprisingly  the  random  effect  specification  gives  a  positive  coefficient.  One  possible 
explanation is that inflation differentials also capture cross-country heterogeneity when the 
latter is not introduced through the random effect specification. Consistently the effect turns 
out to be positive when the random effect model is estimated on the de jure classification. In 
this case the choice of a fixed exchange rate model can be motivated by the fight against 
inflation. 
Similarly, the per capita income turns out to be significant, suggesting more ability to sustain 
the pegged rate, in the full sample pooled estimation but vanishes when the random effect 
specification is chosen the reason might be of the same nature. 
 The coefficient estimate of currency mismatch variable, although shows a negative but not 
significant  sign  as  expected  in  the  pooled  specification,  it  seems  to  be  positively  and 
significantly associated with flexible exchange rate regime in the random effects specification 
under two models (3-4) suggesting that countries with higher exposure to foreign currency 
risk, will be no more able to sustain the fixed rate and thus opt for more flexible regime.  
Control for corruption is also significant with negative sign in the pooled model suggesting 
more  ability  to  maintain  a  fixed  rate  with  goods  institutional  quality.  Geographical 
concentration variable was not associated with any particular regime in both specifications.  
 
 The previous results, in general, suggest that the majority of MENA countries fit well with 
their pegged adjustable exchange rate regimes.  In fact, the expected effect of some variables 
on the probability of choosing a particular exchange rate regime is not so evident a priori and 
has  to  be  analysed  attentively.  This  concerns  mainly  factors  related  to  openness,  level  of 
specialisation, and the financial development.  
 
The conventional view on the choice of exchange rate regime stress that more open economy 
are  more  exposure  to  external  and  reel  shocks  such  as  terms-of-trade  fluctuation.  This  is 
probably  true  for  our  sample  countries,  where  most  countries  are  mainly  producer  and 
exporter  of  primary  goods  like  as  oil  and  agriculture  products  for  which  prices  are  very 
volatile.  A  more  flexibility  of  exchange  rate  in  this  case  allows  for  rapid  adjustment  of   20 
relative prices by exchange rate instrument without incurring a high output cost especially if 
domestic price are rigid and administrable controlled, as is the case, so that the adjustment of 
domestic prices will be slow. Moreover, one would expect that face to large external negative 
shocks,  the  central  bank  would  need  to  intervene  heavily  in  order  to  maintain  a  stable 
exchange rate. If such negative shock remains for a long time, the risk of speculation pressure 
will increase and the peg may be no more sustainable. With foreign debt mostly denominated 
in foreign currency, a sharp depreciation under floating exchange regime may weaken banks’ 
balance  sheets  and  trigger  a  financial  crisis,  a  balance  sheet  effect  reflected  in  the  high 
significant coefficient for the liability dollarization variable. Moreover, a wide openness also 
means a high pass-through1 thus raising the probability of choosing fixed exchange rate.25 
Finally, more flexible exchange rate regimes should certainly be more relevant in developed 
countries with large financial markets than in MENA countries where, financial and foreign 
exchange markets in MENA countries are limited and central banks have no monetary policy 
independence.
 26 
All this arguments tend to confirm that fear of floating factors plays a major role in explaining 
exchange rate regime choice in MENA.
27 A country in our sample will likely choose to fix its 
exchange rate de jure if it has the following characteristics: high openness or/and pass through 
level, economic and financial limited maturity, high level of specialization in primary export 
goods, various capital controls and good institutional quality. A more flexible rate will be 






                                                 
25 For middle Eastern’ countries, the coefficient of pass-through  is 0.49 and 0.96 for the periods 1990-1999 and 
2000-2007 respectively ( Allégret, Ayadi, Khouni (2008)  
26 We note that in our sample, the six Gulf countries in addition to Jordan and Lebanon have a developed 
financial sector compared to other countries in the region. Although they are more open and integrated, they 
keep fixed adjustable exchange rate regimes. The conventional view stresses that, a liberalized financial system 
weakness the capacity of the authorities to defender exchange rate peg. This is especially the case of (soft peg 
regimes) which is supposed to be more prone to bank crisis. However, this problem will be more relevant or 
more costly when the fixed rate is associated with the shortage of liquidity, Chang and Velasco (1998). In effect, 
these countries especially the six Golf countries have a considerable level of liquidity  which offers a solid 
situation and allows dealing with potential self-fulfilling banks run. 
27 The nature of shocks approach is not so relevant in explaining exchange rate regime choice in MENA.  These 
countries face a combination of real and nominal shocks which makes the choice between fixed and flexible rate 
not straightforward.  
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5.1.2  5.1.2  5.1.2  5.1.2 De Facto Exchange Rate Regime 
 
 Although the de jure classification reflects the commitment to a particular exchange rate 
regime, nevertheless, it fails to capture macroeconomic policy that is inconsistent with the 
announced  regime.  For  example,  if  the  institutional  setting  prevents  the  country  from 
maintaining exchange rate stability while the country still claims to have its exchange rate 
fixed, the failure to sustain the fixed rate will not be reflected in the regression results, Vuletin 
(2004). For this reason we test in this sub-section the robustness of our previous finding for de 
facto classification using the two estimation strategies mentioned before.  
Goodness  of  fit  measures  increase  progressively  with  the  inclusion  of  more  variables  as 
before, but it is now larger in the full pooled model than in the restricted one. Table (9-a and 
9-b) reports the results for LYS classification.  
 
Significant and robust coefficient estimates are obtained for most factors: openness, per capita 
income, specialisation level, financial development, foreign liability, inflation differential and 
capital  control  factors.  Some  results  are  in  line  with  our  previous  finding  under  de  jure 
classification. This concerns the following variables: openness, GDP per capita, specialisation 
level,  foreign  liability,  and  control  for  corruption.  We  should  note  that  foreign  liability 
variable is now stronger with larger effects than before.  
 
Indeed,  for  other  variables,  there  were  some  differences  in  comparison  of  the  de  jure 
classification.  Currency  mismatch  is  now  strongly  significant,  only  in  the  pooled 
specification, with the negative expected sign suggesting less tolerability to exchange rate 
volatility. Inflation differential variable is robust and positively related to floating exchange 
rate  regime  under  both  specifications.  Financial  development  and  the  capital  control 
variables are now associated with more flexible regimes.  
 
Concerning the financial development variable, it could be argued that a country with deeper 
and developed financial system will be likely more able to conduct an independent monetary 
policy  which  now  can  be  directed  to  target  internal  objectives.  Indeed,  the  monetary 
authorities will be probably more able to handle high exchange rate volatility under floating 
exchange rate regime. But, in MENA it is dubious that policy makers will be able to take full 
advantage of exchange rate flexibility and will be subject to fear of floating as they will have 
to intervene heavily in foreign exchange market in order to mitigate exchange rate volatility   22 
and to reduce the bank’s balance sheet effect.  The sign of the capital control variable confirm 
this discussion. 
 
The significant and positive sign for capital control reflects the other direction of causality in 
that sense that governments subject to fear of floating under flexible exchange rates will be 
inclined to use capital controls. A closer look at data reveals that; the countries with floating 
exchange rate regimes have, in average, higher capital controls comparing to countries with 
fixed and intermediate exchange rate regimes. It appears that while some MENA countries 
have opted for independent monetary  policy to revive their economy,  they  have imposed 
capital control in order to alleviate the risk of currency and bank crisis, which often was the 
result of reversal capital flows. A selective capital inflow would hence discourager hot money 
and facilities longer term capital inflow.  
 
As a general conclusion, a country would likely choose de facto fixed exchange rate regime if 
it  was  more  open,  less  diversified,  with  high  level  of  economic  development  and  with 
dollarized  financial  system  and  goods  institutional  quality.  A  more  flexible  regime  is 
preferred with sizeable and developed financial system in combination with capitals controls 
and/or if it has higher inflation bias comparing to its trading partner.   
 
5.1.3 5.1.3 5.1.3 5.1.3 The Dynamic Model of Exchange Rate Regime Choice 
 
 In this section we examine how the exchange rate regime in the previous period affects the 
probability of choosing the same regime in the current period. 
We include the previous regime state and a set of variables that were significant only in the 
static random effects specification in order to gain some degree of freedom. Table (10) reports 
the results for de jure and de facto classification. 
The  estimated  coefficient  of  the  two  lagged  dependant  variables  are  large  and  highly 
significant as expected under IMF and LYS classification suggesting that countries are more 
likely to remain in the same regime initially chosen. 
 
Concerning the other independent variables, the results obtained under de jure classification 
are  somewhat  similar  to  those  obtained  with  the  static  random  effects  model  in  term  of 
significance and signs of the coefficients, suggesting that the qualitative implications derived 
above still hold. Nevertheless, In contrast with IMF de jure classification, LYS classification   23 
shows no significant role for the other independent variables; however, we have to note that 
openness  variable  appears  to  be  associated  with  fixed  rate  as  before  at  11%  level  of 
significance. 
 
6      Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion 
 
This paper has discussed and analyzed empirically the determinants of exchange rate regime 
choice  in  MENA  countries  since  1990.  Several  indicators  have  been  used  to  proxy  for 
different  relevant  factors  that  may  have  influenced  the  decision  about  the  exchange  rate 
regime. During most of the period from 1999 to 2000, a period of structural reforms, several 
countries have reconsidered their choices and have opted for more flexible exchange rate 
policy as they became more open and integrated to the international economy. 
   
Nonetheless, even countries with more flexible exchange rate regime have manifested some 
fear of floating. They continue to intervene heavily in exchange rate markets, often maintain 
capital controls, and still keep large reserves as complementary strategies to reduce exchange 
rate fluctuations when necessary.  Our finding points that, although the higher vulnerability of 
MENA to external and real shocks, which calls for a more flexible exchange rate, the fear of 
floating factors such as a high pass-through and foreign liability dollarization explains the 
choice  of  adjustable  peg  exchange  rate  regime  since  fixed  rates  provide  more  financial 
stability in the face of external shocks when balance sheet effects prevails.  However, for 
countries with a high inflation differential rate and a higher exposure to currency risk, a more 
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Annex I 
 
Table 1: Exchange Rate Classification 
  
Regime  IMF  BOR  LYS  
0  Fix  Pegged to: single 
currency,composite of currencies 
conventional fixed peg to 
single currency, conventional 
fixed peg to  basket 
Fix 
1  Intermediate 
Flexibility limited, peg with 
horizontal bands, crawling peg 
crawling bands 
pege in  horizontals bands, 




looking crawling band, tightly 
managed floating 
Dirty/Crawling peg 
2  Float  Managed floating, Independent 
float 
another managed floating, 
independently floating  Dirty Float, float 
 
 
Table 5 : Data Description 
Variable  Description  Source 
        
Openness  Ratio of exports and imports of goods and 
services to the GDP.  IFS/IMF 
GDP per capita  Log  of real GDP in billions of US dollars, 5 
years backward moving average  CEPII 
Geographical 
concentration of trade 
Gini-Hirschman index = 100 √Σ (Xk / X)² a 
high value  for this index means high trade 
concentration 
UN COMTRADE/ AMF 
specialisation in 
primary goods 
Total exports in SITC (section 0 to 5) to 
total export   UN COMTRADE/ AMF 
domestic credit ratio  Domestic credit provided by banking sector 
(line 32)  to GDP   IFS/IMF 
Currency mismatch  Foreign Liability (line 26C) on Foreign 
assett (line 21)  IFS/IMF 
Foreign liability  Foreign Liability (line 26C) as percent of 
money sypply M1  IFS/IMF 
Differential inflation 
Domestic consumer price index minus 
trade-weighting average consumer price 
indexes of the first five trading partners. 
WEO/COMTRADE   28 
capital control   Dummy variable with 0-4 scale  RERERA/IMF 
Control for corruption 
Control of corruption measures the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as “capture” of the state 
by elites and private interests. 





Table 6 : Descriptive statistics : Full Sample 1990-2006 
Var.  Mean  SD.Dev  Median  Min  Max  N.Obs. 
openness  .8019566  .3561377  .7365243   .2929624  2.673906  264 
per capita   8.60121   1.496558    8.527143   6.102067  12.92703  289 
trade   .4254971  .2082024  .3731061   .0548465   1.65998  222 
special.  .5862337    .348912  .742858  .0122286    1.08848  251 
fin.devel  .5032334   .3711547   .4486533  -.5970801  2.174736  269 
mismatch  .6906772   .5982211    .5744   .0077475    4.285508  284 
 liability   .6913605  .9797687  .3094031  .0053422   6.017026  288 
 inflation   .0613928    .1801499    .0126428  -.1825738  1.159247  266 
control   1.681661    1.489212   1  0  4  289 




   Table 7 : Pairwaise Correlation between relevant variables 
   openness  per 
capita  trade   special.  fin.devel  mismatch   
liability 
 
inflation  control  corrupt 
openness   1.0000                   
per capita  0.1810  1.0000                 
trade   -0.2489   -0.2293   
1.0000               
special.  -0.0643   0.1142  -
0.2837  1.0000              
fin.devel   0.0329  0.1439    
0.0288   -0.3649   1.0000           
mismatch  -0.1551  -0.1281   
0.0236  -0.0964   0.2905  1.0000          
 liability   0.3554   0.1573  -
0.1218   -0.4443    0.3334   0.1510    1.0000       
 inflation  -0.2551   -0.1766    
0.2436  
 -
0.2787   -0.1599   -0.0230   0.0749  1.0000      
control   -0.4577  -0.5592   
0.3353 
 -
0.0812    0.0924   0.1651   -0.4049  0.1385   1.0000   
corruption  -0.0374    0.0554    
0.2170  
 -
0.1904   0.2156    0.0168  -0.0104  0.1158  -0.0485   1.0000  
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Table 8-a : Choice of Exchange Rate Regime: IMF (de Jure) Classification 
 Pooled Ordered Probit Model Estimation 
Independant Variables  Dependent variable: Exchange rate regime (0=fix ; 1=intermediate; 2=float) 
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
 Openness  -1.074169   -.4526252    -.4981319  -1.324496 
  (-3.82)***  (-1.24)    (-1.34)   (-2.97)*** 
GDP per capita   .0584691  .0897196  .0659889   
   (0.86)   (1.25)   (0.83)   
Trade concentration  -.4523001  -.4532355  -.3846627  .4338013 
  (-0.92)  (-0.86)   (-0.72)  (0.61) 
Specialisation  -1.664263   -1.392909  -1.414573  -1.80607 
  (-4.43)***   (-3.48)***  (-3.44)***   (-3.55)*** 
Financial development   -1.481029   -1.214817  -1.160418  -.6292685 
  (-5.74)***  (-4.24)***   (-4.11)***  (-1.47) 
Currency mismatch  -.1247838  -.0323571  -.0130287  -.1822249 
  (-0.73)  (-0.19)   (-0.08)   (-0.66) 
Foreign liability  -.1042079   -.3384882   -.3814206  -.4466297 
  ( -0.71)  (-1.53)  (-1.61)  (-1.98)* 
Differential inflation     3.199376   3.349102   3.705845 
    (2.46)**   (2.57)***   (2.56 )*** 
Capital Control       -.0687781   -.261972  
      (-0.76)   (-2.27)** 
Control for corruption        -.8491734 
        (-5.38 )*** 
dum_>1999  -.470505   -.4725133   -.4565503  -.3645939 
   (-2.53)***   (-2.49)**   (-2.39)***   (-1.52) 
              
No. Of obs.  197  194  194  155 
Log likelihood   -170.64092  -161.51139  -161.25433  -111.85114 
Pseudo R²  0.1376  0.1733  0.1746  0.2657 
         
Note: z-statistics are presented below the coressponding coefficient   
        standard errors are corrected for potential heterososcedasticity using Huber/White/sandwich estimator 
        Full sample: 17 countries 1990-2006       
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Table 8-b : Choice of Exchange Rate Regime: IMF (de Jure) Classification 
Random Effects Ordered Probit Model Estimation 
Independant Variables  Dependent variable: Exchange rate regime (0=fix; 1=intermediate; 2=float) 
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
 Openness  -.4939791  -2.155875  -2.896394  -4.569696  
  (-0.91)   (-3.61)***  (-3.83)***  (-4.95)*** 
GDP per capita  -.095773  -.3210831  -.6230719   -.6027309 
  (-0.97)  (-2.61)***  (-4.13)***  (-3.28)*** 
Trade concentration  -.9353235  -1.42836  -.6726969   -1.364503  
  (-0.84)   (-1.41)  (-0.65)  (-1.10) 
Specialisation  -3.548609  -4.610073  -5.36134   -4.48729  
  (-3.84)***  ( -4.84)***  (-5.61)***  ( -4.81)*** 
Financial development  -3.093908  -2.64278  -2.470798    -2.783679 
   (-3.68)***    (-3.87)***  (-3.43)***  (-3.06)***  
Currency mismatch   .2754825  .2511355  .557469   .7627347  
   (0.76)   (0.83)   (1.70)*   (1.98) ** 
Foreign liability  -.5657961   -.694263   -1.133602   -1.090506 
  (-1.97)**   (-2.42)**  (-3.26)***     (-2.36)**  
Differential inflation    -3.574286  -2.507114   -3.565547 
    ( -2.99)***  (-1.65)*   (-2.05)** 
Capital Control      -.8087777   -1.22902 
       (-3.66)***   (-4.04)*** 
Control for corruption        .2770696 
         (0.70) 
dum_>1999  -.9509489   -1.458145    -1.409514  -1.902899  
  (-3.48)***  (-4.71)***   (-4.32)***  (-4.55)*** 
Rho  .6296557  .6919521  .6286806  .8294432 
    5.19***  (8.12)***  (7.56)***  (14.63)*** 
              
No. Of obs.  136  133  133  111 
Log likelihood   -97.840654  -87.236737   -82.487005  -64.521934  
Pseudo R²  0,2  0,251  0,292  0,333 
          
Note: z-statistics are presented below the coressponding coefficient   
        Restricted sample: 12 countries 1990-2006       
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Table 9-a : Choice of Exchange Rate Regime: LYS (de Facto) Classification 
Pooled Ordered Probit Model Estimation 
Independant Variables  Dependent variable: Exchange rate regime (0=fix; 1=intermediate; 2=float) 
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
 Openness  -1.552278  .1508681   .7564031  -.2731243 
  (-3.47)***  (0.27)   (1.29)   (-0.45) 
GDP per capita  -.12836  -.0874681  .0215723  .0146788 
  (-1.94)*   (-1.25)   (0.26)  (0.16) 
Trade concentration  .206894  -.1746119  -.4899589  -.3572797 
   (0.34)  (-0.28)   (-0.83)  (-0.55)  
Specialisation  -1.05461  -.6662409  -.5015013  -.7851286 
  (-2.88)***    (-1.69)*   (-1.28)   (-1.60)  
Financial development  .0735143  1.275425  1.309659  2.051445 
  (0.23)   (2.94)***  (2.75)**  (3.71)*** 
Currency mismatch  -.3926183  -.4547373  -.6859935  -.9243245 
    (-1.97)**  (-2.03)**  (-2.62)***   (-2.95)*** 
Foreign liability  -.3582292  -1.303201  -1.324337  -1.305564 
  (-2.29)**    (-3.66)***   (-3.65)***   (-3.34)*** 
Differential inflation    5.412189    5.794017  5.821214 
     (3.49)***  (3.46)***  (3.32)*** 
Capital Control      .3622806  .3063997 
        (3.39)  (2.40)**  
Control for corruption        -.5778408 
        (-3.54)*** 
dum_>1999    .1854811  .6387503  .7344651  1.053889 
   (0.88)  (2.74)***   (2.93)**  (3.00)*** 
              
No. Of obs.  197  194  194  162 
Log likelihood   -140.51451    -119.48232  -114.11866  -90.301422 
Pseudo R²  0.1595  0.2716  0.3043  0.3454 
         
Note: z-statistics are presented below the coressponding coefficient     
        standard errors are corrected for potential heterososcedasticity using Huber/White/sandwich estimator 
        Full sample: 17 countries 1990-2006       
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Table 9-b : Choice of Exchange Rate Regime: LYS (de Facto) Classification 
Random Effects Ordered Probit Model Estimation 
Independant Variables  Dependent variable: Exchange rate regime (0=fix; 1=intermediate; 2=float) 
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
 Openness  -1.984871  -.3427187     
  (-2.03) **    (-0.43)        
GDP per capita   -.3720873  -.4942893  -.3305219  -.2407617 
  (-2.81)***    (-3.30)**     (-2.57)***  (-1.80)** 
Trade concentration  .7072485  -1.820584  -.2926237   
  (0.76)     (-1.56)    (-0.30)   
Specialisation    -2.346179       
  (-2.84)***       
Financial development  1.112273  1.173504      2.167288  2.980694 
  (1.33)    (2.56)***     (2.45)**    (2.65)***  
Currency mismatch  -.0746205  .243939  -.1291384  -.2651566 
  (-0.26)   (0.68)   (-0.34)  (-0.64)   
Foreign liability  -1.175499  -1.185498  -1.207896  -1.146556 
  (-3.51)***     (-2.85)***    (-3.31)***     (-2.04)**    
Differential inflation    1.743024  2.039157  1.558151 
    (1.24)   (1.79)*    (1.07)   
Capital Control      .2600557  .4153584 
      (1.61)    (2.39)**    
Control for corruption        -.1271077 
        (-0.50) 
dum_>1999  .5860009  .8096051  1.025124  1.19181 
  (1.99)**     (2.31)**    (2.98)***     (2.99)***    
Rho  .1220746  .714677  .545967  .7998221 
   (0.57)    (6.57)***     (3.74)***   (11.08)***    
              
No. Of obs.  105  107  111  92 
Log likelihood   -82.952841  -84.622895  -84.339096  -66.981035 
Pseudo R²  0.0853  0.0924   0.0994  0 .1348 
          
Note: z-statistics are presented below the coressponding coefficient   
        Restricted sample: 9 countries 1990-2006       
        ¹ Estimated without liability       
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Table 10 : Dynamic Choice of Exchange Rate Regime: IMF(de Jure)  versus LYS (de Facto) 
Classification 
Dynamic Random Effects Ordered Probit Model Estimation 
Independant Variables  Dependent variable: Exchange rate regime (0=fix; 1=intermediate; 2=float) 
   IMF  LYS 
Lag_interm.  1.725083  2.095184 
   (4.20)***  (4.65)*** 
Lag_float  2.971493  2.019212 
   (6.63)***  (5.67)*** 
 Openness  -.3514092  -1.038737 
   (-0.57)  (- 1.59)  
GDP per capita  -.2612864  -.0903897 
   (-1.71)*  (-0.69) 
Specialisation  -1.550856   
   (-1.71)**   
Financial development  -.490028  1.040295 
    (-0.66)   (1.42) 
Currency mismatch  .0962156   
   (0.28)   
Foreign liability  -.7811332  -.2634959 
   (-2.72)***  (-0.99) 
Differential inflation  1.064941  .5439232 
   (0.85)  (0.70) 
Capital Control  -.3295513  .1420113 
   (-1.42)  (0.91) 
Rho  .1514727  .0897149 
   (0.61 )   (0.63) 
        
No. Of obs.  143  121 
Log likelihood   -82.042329  -87.636634 
Pseudo R²  0,3707  0.2207 
         
Note: z-statistics are presented below the coressponding coefficient     
¹ estimated without foreign liability        
 Sample : 12 countries (1990-2006) for IMF classification and 9 countries (1990-2006) for LYS classification 
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